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Abstract: In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the central banks of
small open economies such as the Swiss National Bank (SNB) implemented a
unilateral one-sided exchange rate target zone vis-à-vis the euro currency to
counteract deflationary pressures. Recently, the SNB abandoned its minimum
exchange rate regime, arguing that after having analyzed the costs and benefits
of this non-standard exchange rate policy measure, it was no longer sustainable.
This paper proposes a model that allows central banks and policymakers to
estimate ex-ante the costs of implementing and maintaining a unilateral one-
sided target zone (in terms of the expected size of foreign-exchange interven-
tions) and to monitor these costs during the period in which it is enforced. The
model also offers central banks a tool to identify the right timing for the
discontinuation of a minimum exchange rate regime. An empirical application
to the Swiss case shows the ex-ante estimated size of these costs and reveals
that these costs might have been substantial without the abandonment of the
minimum exchange rate regime, which accords with the official statements of
the SNB.
Keywords: foreign-exchange interventions, foreign exchange reserves, minimum
exchange rate, reflected geometric Brownian motion, target zone costs, Swiss
National Bank
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1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis that erupted in 2007/08, the central
banks of small open economies (e. g., measured by the open market index of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC RESEARCH FOUNDATION, 2013)) such as
the Czech National Bank (CNB) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB) both
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implemented a unilateral one-sided exchange rate target zone vis-à-vis the euro
currency since November 7, 2013 to date and from September 6, 2011 to January
15, 2015, respectively. Before this crisis, the central banks of other small open
economies such as the Swedish Riksbank from 1993 to 2002 (HUMPAGE and
RAGNARTZ, 2006), the Croatian National Bank in 1993 (COTTARELLI and DOYLE,
1999) and the Central Bank of Hong Kong from autumn 2003 up to May 20051
had temporarily introduced a one-sided target zone to prevent the domestic
currency from appreciating vis-à-vis a specific foreign currency beyond some
announced minimum exchange rate level, herewith implementing a so-called
strong-side commitment. Moreover, in 1978, the SNB already had temporarily
implemented a one-sided target zone, when the SNB set a minimum exchange
rate vis-à-vis the Deutsche mark (DEM) to impede a strengthening of the Swiss
franc (CHF) beyond the level of DEM-CHF 0.80.2
Recently, a strand of literature has emerged that analyzes the credibility of
the Swiss target zone vis-à-vis the euro currency in the aforementioned period of
interest (HERTRICH and ZIMMERMANN, 2015) and estimates the latent spot EUR-CHF
exchange rate that would have prevailed without the SNB’s non-standard
exchange rate policy measure (HANKE, POULSEN, and WEISSENSTEINER (2014), HANKE,
POULSEN, and WEISSENSTEINER (2015) and JERMANN (2015)). Other studies explore
whether the exchange rate target model developed by KRUGMAN (1991) provides
a good explanation of the Swiss currency in the period where the EUR-CHF 1.20
exchange rate floor was enforced (STUDER-SUTER and JANSSEN (2014), LERA and
SORNETTE (2016) and HERTRICH (2016)). This paper contributes to this strand of
literature and proposes a model that allows central banks to estimate ex-ante
the costs of implementing and maintaining a unilateral one-sided target zone (in
terms of the change in the size of the domestic central bank’s balance sheet due
to foreign exchange interventions) and to monitor these costs during the period
where it is enforced. The model also offers central banks a tool to identify the
right timing for the discontinuation of a minimum exchange rate regime. The
timing is relevant, since this policy may create unwanted asset price bubbles if
central banks wait too long to abandon this policy. An empirical application to
the Swiss case shows the ex-ante estimated size of these costs in the period
1 In 2005, Hong Kong switched to a two-sided target zone by installing a strong-side boundary
for the Hong Kong dollar-U.S. dollar (USD) exchange rate, see GENBERG and HUI (2011) or CHEN,
FUNKE, and GLANEMANN (2013).
2 Furthermore, the empirical results in CHEN and GIOVANNINI (1992) indicate that under the
European Monetary System in the 1990s some central banks indeed were enforcing an implicit
upper or lower boundary. Similarly, the Japanese monetary authorities have actively intervened
in the foreign exchange market to impede appreciations of the yen vis-à-vis the USD (CHABOUD
and HUMPAGE, 2005) and as such have created a temporary lower boundary.
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where the minimum EUR-CHF exchange rate regime was in place and reveals
that these costs might have been substantial without the abandonment of the
minimum exchange rate regime, which accords with the official statements of
the SNB.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 shows how the exchange rate
can be modeled under a strong-side commitment when the domestic central
bank enforces a minimum exchange rate on a continuous basis. In Section 3, it
is shown how the costs of implementing and maintaining a unilateral one-sided
target zone (or strong-side commitment) can be estimated ex-ante and during
the period where it is enforced. As a robustness check, Section 4 considers an
alternative way of modeling these costs, while Section 5 analyzes the actual
costs of the SNB’s exchange rate policy regime vis-à-vis the euro currency from
September 6, 2011 to January 15, 2015 and discusses the timing of the SNB’s
decision to abandon this policy. Section 6 summarizes the main findings of the
paper.
2 The exchange rate dynamics in a one-sided
target zone
2.1 Free floating exchange rate regime
Assume that before the implementation of the strong-side commitment the spot
exchange rate Ft (quoted as the number of units of domestic currency required to
buy one unit of foreign currency as of time t, see, for instance, REISWICH and
WYSTUP (2010)) follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) process (which is a
commonly used assumption in finance, see GLASSERMAN (2004), WYSTUP (2010a),
MUSIELA and RUTKOWSKI (2009) or GEMAN (2015), among others) in a free floating
exchange rate system with drift coefficient μ and diffusion coefficient σ,
respectively:
dFt = μFtdt + σFtdWt, ð1Þ
where dWt denotes the increment of a standard Wiener process. By applying
Ito’s lemma to ln (Ft), we find that
ft ≡d ln Ftð Þ= μ− σ
2
2
 
dt + σdWt. ð2Þ
The exchange rate is a martingale if the drift coefficient μ is replaced by
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μ* = r − rf , ð3Þ
where r and rf are the annual, continuously compounded risk-free interest rates
in the domestic and foreign currency, respectively.
2.2 Minimum exchange rate regime
Inspired by the recent non-standard exchange rate policy of the SNB that
enforced a minimum EUR-CHF 1.20 exchange rate from September 6, 2011 to
January 15, 2015, this paper focuses on a unilateral (in the following, this term
will be omitted for the sake of simplicity) one-sided target zone for the exchange
rate Ft subject to a lower boundary b, whereby a central bank intervenes in the
spot market with unsterilized foreign exchange transactions by buying a specific
foreign currency3 (e. g., the euro currency in the case of the SNB) to maintain a
minimum exchange rate b (which will be called “floor” in the following),
whenever necessary. As a consequence, the observed spot exchange rate
under the minimum exchange rate regime St will be equal to or larger than the
latent (or now shadow) exchange rate Ft (i. e., the exchange rate that would
prevail without the interventions of the domestic central bank). The observed
exchange rate St then equals:
St = Ft max 1, max
0 ≤ s ≤ t
b=Fs
 
, for ≤ t ≤T, ð4Þ
where T denotes the finite lifetime (in years) of the minimum exchange rate
regime.
According to Equation (4), as long as Ft > b, the spot exchange rate St is
equal to the latent exchange rate Ft (and therefore S0 = F0), as no interventions
by the domestic central bank have changed the domestic monetary base yet.
However, once the latent exchange rate Ft falls below the floor level b (e. g., if F0
< b, then S0 equals b), a gap emerges between Ft and the observed exchange rate
St, reflecting the interventions of the domestic central bank that drive a wedge
between both exchange rates (since the unsterilized interventions change the
domestic monetary base). Moreover, if after these interventions the latent
exchange rate increases again (i. e., by exogenous factors), these exchange
3 Given that before the SNB discontinued the minimum exchange rate, other alternatives to a
removal of the minimum EUR-CHF 1.20 exchange rate were discussed as well, most notably a
pegging of the Swiss franc to a currency basket (see, e. g., BALTENSPERGER (2015) and BERNHOLZ
(2015)), the domestic central bank may alternatively peg its currency to a currency basket to
enforce a minimum exchange rate.
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rate changes will be reflected one-to-one in the observed spot exchange rate St.
Consequently, whenever St > b, the risk-neutralized drift rate of St and the drift
rate μ* of Ft will be identical.
Scaling the stochastic process St in Equation (4) by the floor b and taking
logs, the resulting stochastic process {ln(St/b)} results from the (scaled)
exchange rate process {ln(Ft/b)} in a free-floating exchange rate regime by
introducing a reflecting barrier at zero.4 After simple algebra, it can be shown
that the stochastic process {ln(St/b)} is a representation of a reflected (or regu-
lated) BM started at {ln(S0/b)} (GRAVERSEN and SHIRYAEV (2000) and KO, SHIU, and
WEI (2010)), which accords with the foreign exchange rate dynamics implied by
the KRUGMAN (1991)-type models (HUI, LO, and FONG (2015) and LO ET AL. (2015)).
Consequently and in accordance with the target zone model developed by
VEESTRAETEN (2013), the observed exchange rate can be modeled as a reflected
GBM (RGBM):
dSt = r − rf
   Stdt + σStdWt + StdLt, ð5Þ
where the process Lt is the so-called reflection function in SKOROKHOD (1961) and
represents the cumulative increase in the exchange rate effected by the domestic
central bank up to time t. Given the setup in the empirical analysis in Section 5,
Lt is a continuous, non-decreasing process with L0 = 0 and increases only when
St hits the lower barrier b (see, e. g., HARRISON (1985)). In that case, reflection
takes place instantaneously. This reflection mechanism ensures that the
exchange rate does not spend finite time on the barrier, such that no situation
can arise in which the exchange rate could only move in one direction, hereby
enabling risk-less arbitrage gains (see, e. g., INGERSOLL JR. (1987) on page 270 or
BERGMAN (1996) for more details about this statement) and thereby attracting
speculators. For more details on the reflection mechanism and its implications
for option pricing, the interested reader is referred to VEESTRAETEN (2008).
Let S0 denote the exchange rate that is observed in the market just after
announcing the introduction of a lower floor level for the exchange rate Ft.
Assuming that the domestic currency is (potentially) overvalued vis-à-vis the
involved foreign currency prior to the announcement of the floor,5 which
induces the domestic central bank to introduce a nonstandard exchange rate
policy measure in the form of a minimum exchange rate that either equals or is
below the “fair” (or fundamental) equilibrium exchange rate at inception, it is
4 See, e. g., FLOOD and MARION (1994), GERBER and PAFUMI (2000), KO, SHIU, and WEI (2010),
VEESTRAETEN (2013), HERTRICH and ZIMMERMANN (2015) and NEUMAN and SCHIED (2015) for a similar
approach applied to foreign exchange markets or in the context of investment funds.
5 Which accords with the official statements of the SNB.
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assumed that the spot exchange rate “jumps” to S0 = F0 > F–1 just after officially
announcing the introduction of the floor, which can be motivated by the signal-
ling channel (see, e. g., DOMINGUEZ (1998) and SARNO and TAYLOR (2001)).6 Hence,
assuming that the latent exchange rate Ft is the equilibrium exchange rate for
t ≥0 that would prevail without the enforcement of the floor (which accords with
the assumption in HANKE, POULSEN, and WEISSENSTEINER (2014), HANKE, POULSEN, and
WEISSENSTEINER (2015) and JERMANN (2015)), under the strong-side commitment St ≥
Ft for t ≥0, whereby the domestic currency will be either “fairly” priced or
undervalued (due to the possibility of interventions by the domestic central
bank) with respect to the foreign currency compared to the situation in a free-
floating exchange rate regime.
Let p(x; k,T), x>0, denote the transition probability density of the RBM
process {ln(St/b)} with the log-moneyness k= ln(S0/b). Under the risk-neutral
measure (COX and MILLER, 1965), this density function equals:7
p x; k, Tð Þ = n x; k + μ*  T, σ2  T + bS0
 	θ− 1
 n x;− k + μ*  T, σ2  T 
− θ− 1ð Þ  exp θ− 1ð Þx  1 +Φ x + k + μ*.T
σ ﬃﬃTp
 	h i
,
ð6Þ
with θ= 2μ
2
σ2 , where n(x; μ,σ
2) denotes the probability density function of the
normal distribution with mean μ and standard deviation σ and Φ(x) denotes the
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
2.3 RGBM and the Krugman target zone model
STUDER-SUTER and JANSSEN (2014), LERA and SORNETTE (2016) and HERTRICH (2016)
analyze the suitability of the target zone model developed by KRUGMAN (1991)
(which is based on the assumption that the fundamental variable follows a
reflected GBM) in describing the EUR-CHF exchange rate dynamics in the period
of interest. Their results support the main empirical implications (see SVENSSON
6 Assuming that the announcement of the floor is interpreted as the “fully credible” willingness
of the domestic central bank to not tolerate an overvaluation of the domestic currency anymore
and to actively intervene in the FX market with unsterilized transactions (i. e., by affecting the
current or future fundamentals), whereby initially the spot exchange rate S0 equals the market’s
perceived “new” fundamental exchange rate. Notice that the SNB indeed stopped sterilizing
interventions in the indicated period of interest. Alternatively, F0 can be set equal to F–1, which
would give a proxy for the maximum costs of implementing a one-sided target zone in the
described setting. For more details on this statement, see the last paragraph in Section 3.
7 The transition probability density p(x; k, T) corresponds to Equation (2.4) in GERBER and PAFUMI
(2000), Equation (2.5) in KO, SHIU, and WEI (2010) and Equation (5) in VEESTRAETEN (2008).
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(1992a)) that the Krugman model predicts. Hence, an exchange rate model based
on the Krugman framework is a natural step. Moreover, the exchange rate
dynamics that have been proposed in Subsection 2.2 can also be related to the
target zone model developed by KRUGMAN (1991): In the KRUGMAN (1991) target zone
model the natural logarithm of the exchange rate st ≡ ln(St) depends linearly on
current macroeconomic fundamentals (i. e., on fundamental determinants of the
exchange rate, such as the domestic output, both the domestic and foreign
money supply, as well as the foreign interest rate and the foreign price level
(SVENSSON, 1992a)) and expectations of future values of the exchange rate. As
proposed in VEESTRAETEN (2000), st can be related to the log of the (aggregated)
fundamental of the exchange rate, which in KRUGMAN (1991) can be modeled as a
RBM (FROOT and OBSTFELD, 1991). Specifically, if the interest rate semi-elasticity of
money demand α in KRUGMAN (1991) is set equal to zero, the log-exchange rate st
will equal the macroeconomic fundamental. Hence, in this case and assuming
that uncovered interest rate parity holds, the drift coefficient of both the
exchange rate and the fundamental should be equal to the interest differential
r– rf ( = μ* in this paper).
Moreover, as shown in FLOOD, ROSE, and MATHIESON (1991), the aforementioned
interest rate semielasticity of money demand α can be estimated by running the
following regression:
Δst =ψ+ α Δrt −Δrft
h i
+ ηt, ð7Þ
Using the data described in Subsection 5.1, the estimated semi-elasticity α^ is
statistically insignificant for the EUR-CHF FX rate in the period of interest
(see Table A.1 in the Appendix A), whereby the assumption of a RGBM for St
can be related to the assumption of a RGBM for the fundamental in the Krugman
target zone model. In addition, according to HUI, LO, and FONG (2015) and LO et al.
(2015) the assumption of a RGBM for the fundamental implies a RGBM for the
corresponding exchange rate.
3 The costs of implementing a one-sided
target zone
Assume that the central bank of the domestic country has a finite lifetime T for
the strong-side commitment in mind that is, however, not publicly announced
when introducing a one-sided target zone (or an unknown maturity that is
constant, as in HANKE, POULSEN, and WEISSENSTEINER (2015)). Let V(S0, T) denote
the costs (as of time t=0) per unit of foreign currency of implementing a strong-
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side commitment for a lifetime T, in the sense of the extra amount of foreign
currency (measured in units of the domestic currency) that a central bank has to
buy due to its commitment to a publicly announced intervention level b for the
previously free-floating exchange rate Ft. Hence, the unit cost V(S0,T) can be
modeled as the difference between the discounted expected value of holding
one unit of foreign currency both under the strong-side commitment and in a
free-floating exchange rate system (ST – FT), measured in units of the domestic
currency, as the “upgraded” spot exchange rate St is the result of the (expected)
FX interventions by the domestic central bank in order to maintain a strong-side
commitment for T years, buying just enough foreign currency at the minimum
exchange rate, whenever necessary, so that St does not fall below b:
V S0, Tð Þ =V F0, Tð Þ = exp rf − rð ÞT EQRGBM STð Þ−EQGBM FTð Þ
h i
,
= exp r
f − rð ÞTEQRGBM STð Þ− F0,
ð8Þ
with F0 = S0 and where the discounted expected values exp
rf − rð ÞT ½EQ ð Þ
n o
are
calculated under the corresponding risk-neutral measure Q with respect to the
parameters μ* and σ.8 The costs therefore reflect the FX interventions that are
required to maintain the exchange rate above the targeted floor level, given the
current spot exchange rate. In the following, this model will be denoted by
“model 1”.
Alternatively, the costs can be interpreted as the gap (or misalignment)
between the exchange rate that the domestic central bank regards as the
fundamental value of its currency vis-à-vis a specific currency under a minimum
exchange rate regime and the free float spot exchange rate F0, whereby the costs
V(S0, T) equal zero, whenever both the market’s and the central bank’s view
coincide. According to this interpretation, V(S0,T)/S0 reflects the required depre-
ciation that is necessary to move the spot market FX rate towards the funda-
mental value that the domestic central bank considers as “fair” (see Section 5 for
more details).
Plugging the transition probability density p(x; k,T) into Equation (8) and
following the steps in GERBER and PAFUMI (2000) or KO, SHIU, and WEI (2010), using
the interest parity condition for ST and the integrals in Appendix B, the following
costs (as of time t=0) of maintaining a minimum exchange rate are obtained:
8 Notice that uncovered interest parity has been applied in Equation (8), which is a standard
assumption in the target zone literature (see, e. g., the credibility tests of target zones by
SVENSSON (1991) and BERTOLA and SVENSSON (1993) that rely on this parity or the theoretical work
on the foreign exchange risk premium in target zone models (SVENSSON, 1992b)) and is in line
with the results documented in KUGLER and WEDER (2009) for the EUR-CHF exchange rate.
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V S0,Tð Þ= b exp rf − rð ÞT 1− 1θ
 
Φ
ln b=S0ð Þ− μ* − σ2=2
 
T
σ
ﬃﬃﬃ
T
p
 
+
b
θ
b
S0
 θ
Φ
ln b=S0ð Þ+ μ* + σ2=2
 
T
σ
ﬃﬃﬃ
T
p
 
+ S0Φ
ln S0=bð Þ+ μ* + σ2=2
 
T
σ
ﬃﬃﬃ
T
p
 
− S0.
ð9Þ
Similarly, the corresponding costs for a remaining lifetime ~T ≡ T − t of the target
zone equals the difference between expected exchange rate under a minimum
exchange rate regime for further ~T periods and the spot exchange rate (see
Equations (2.11) and (5.2) in GERBER and PAFUMI (2000)):
V St, ~T
 
= b exp r
f − rð Þ~T 1− 1
θ
 
Φ
ln b=Stð Þ− μ* − σ2=2
  ﬃﬃﬃ
~T
p
σ
ﬃﬃﬃ
~T
p
 !
+
b
θ
b
St
 θ
Φ
ln b=Stð Þ+ μ* + σ2=2
 
~T
σ
ﬃﬃﬃ
~T
p
 !
+ StΦ
ln St=bð Þ+ μ* + σ2=2
 
~T
σ
ﬃﬃﬃ
~T
p
 !
− St.
ð10Þ
Notice that the costs V St, ~T
 
are equal to zero at t=T.
In the following, the impact of the parameters b and T (i. e., the two
parameters that the domestic central bank can choose freely) on the unit
costs V(S0, T) is analyzed. Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how
increasing the lifetime T of a one-sided target zone increases the costs of
implementing a minimum exchange rate regime, irrespective of the sign of the
drift rate μ*. Similarly, the larger the implemented floor level b, the more costly
it is for the domestic central bank to maintain a one-sided target zone, as it has
to (potentially) intervene more often to implement the minimum exchange
rate b.
Comparing Table 1 with Table 2 and Figure 1 with Figure 2, it becomes
evident that the unit costs are larger when the drift rate μ* is negative (Table 1
and Figure 1), as in this case the foreign currency is expected to depreciate vis-à-
vis the domestic currency over time according to uncovered interest parity.
Hence, implementing a strong-side commitment becomes ceteris paribus more
“expensive”, as the undervaluation (the value of St vs. the value of Ft, for 0 ≤
t ≤ T) induced by the interventions of the domestic central bank increases faster
over time than in the case in which the drift rate μ* is positive. Consequently, in
this case the domestic central bank could increase the domestic interest rate
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Table 2: Unit costs of a one-sided target zone (μ* > 0; Model 1).
T b
. . . . . .
m . . . . . .
m . . . . . .
m . . . . . .
m . . . . . .
y . . . . . .
y . . . . . .
y . . . . . .
y . . . . . .
y . . . . . .
y . . . . . .
Notes: The table displays the unit costs V(S0,T) of implementing a one-sided target zone for a
lifetime T of 1 month (1m), 2 months (2m), 3 months (3m), 6 months (6m), 1 year (1y), 2 years
(2y), 3 years (3y), 4 years (4y), 5 years (5y) or 10 years (10y) and different floor levels b. The
domestic and foreign risk-free interest rates equal r=4% and rf= 1%. The spot and latent
exchange rate at time t=0 (i. e., S0 and F0) both equal 1.25 with a volatility level of σ=8%.
Table 1: Unit costs of a one-sided target zone (μ* < 0; Model 1).
T b
. . . . . .
m . . . . . .
m . . . . . .
m . . . . . .
m . . . . . .
y . . . . . .
y . . . . . .
y . . . . . .
y . . . . . .
y . . . . . .
y . . . . . .
Notes: The table displays the unit costs V(S0,T) of implementing a one-sided target zone for a
lifetime T of 1 month (1m), 2 months (2m), 3 months (3m), 6 months (6m), 1 year (1y), 2 years
(2y), 3 years (3y), 4 years (4y), 5 years (5y) or 10 years (10y) and different floor levels b. The
domestic and foreign risk-free interest rates equal r= 1% and rf=4%. The spot and latent
exchange rate at time t=0 (i. e., S0 and F0) both equal 1.25 with a volatility level of σ=8%.
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(whereby μ* would increase and become either positive or less negative) to
lower the costs V(S0, T).
Before concluding this section, notice that when a central bank is consider-
ing whether to implement a one-sided target zone or not, the maximum costs of
this exchange rate policy can be estimated ex-ante by setting S0 = b and F0 = F–1
in Equation (8), assuming that the spot exchange rate is close to the announced
floor level just after announcing a minimum exchange rate policy and that the
domestic currency is either fairly priced or overvalued prior to the announce-
ment of the floor.9
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Figure 1: Unit costs of a one-sided target zone (μ* < 0; Model 1).
Notes: The figure shows the unit costs V(S0, T) of implementing a one-sided target zone for a
lifetime T of 1 month (1m), 2 months (2m), 3 months (3m), 6 months (6m), 1 year (1y), 2 years
(2y), 3 years (3y), 4 years (4y), 5 years (5y) or 10 years (10y) and different floor levels b. The
domestic and foreign risk-free interest rates equal r= 1% and rf=4%. The spot and latent
exchange rate at time t=0 (i. e., S0 and F0) both equal 1.25 with a volatility level of σ=8%.
9 It can be easily shown that V(S0, T) is decreasing in S0 and F0 (see Appendix D). Hence, since
S0 ≥ b, St ≥ Ft and assuming that the domestic currency was previously either fairly priced or
overvalued (hence, the following condition holds: F0 ≥ F–1), it must be the case that these costs
are at its maximum when F0 = F–1 < b= S0.
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4 Robustness check: the costs under
an alternative modeling approach
Of course, there is room for using alternative models: The observed spot
exchange rate (St in Sections 2 and 3) can as well be modeled as the sum of
the latent exchange rate (Ft in Sections 2 and 3) and the price of an American put
option on the latent exchange rate PA(Ft,T) with an uncertain, but constant
lifetime T, whereby the domestic central bank implicitly writes (cancels) put
options, when it sells (buys) the foreign currency (HANKE, POULSEN, and
WEISSENSTEINER 2015):
St = Ft +PA Ft,Tð Þ. ð11Þ
Since there are no closed-form formulas for non-perpetual American options
when it is assumed that the underlying follows a geometric Brownian motion,
HANKE, POULSEN, and WEISSENSTEINER (2015) argue that the American put option will
never be exercised before maturity, given the fact that both the interest rates in
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Figure 2: Unit costs of a one-sided target zone (μ* > 0; Model 1).
Notes: The figure shows the unit costs V(S0,T) of implementing a one-sided target zone for a
lifetime T of 1 month (1m), 2 months (2m), 3 months (3m), 6 months (6m), 1 year (1y), 2 years
(2y), 3 years (3y), 4 years (4y), 5 years (5y) or 10 years (10y) and different floor levels b. The
domestic and foreign risk-free interest rates equal r=4% and rf= 1%. The spot and latent
exchange rate at time t=0 (i. e., S0 and F0) both equal 1.25 with a volatility level of σ=8%.
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the domestic country they analyze (Switzerland) are close to zero and given that
the interest rates in the foreign country (the euro zone) are larger. Consequently,
the American put option on the latent exchange rate in HANKE, POULSEN, and
WEISSENSTEINER (2015) can be replaced by a European put option P(Ft,T):
10
St = Ft + P Ft, Tð Þ. ð12Þ
Moreover, from the point of view of the domestic central bank, the uncertain
lifetime T in their model can be replaced by a known maturity date T. The
European put option in HANKE, POULSEN, and WEISSENSTEINER (2015) can then be
priced using the GARMAN and KOHLHAGEN (1983) model.
Under this modeling approach, EUR-CHF option contracts on the spot
exchange rate St can be interpreted as compound options in the period of
interest. Hence, the costs associated with the monetary policy regime described
in HANKE, POULSEN, and WEISSENSTEINER (2015) can easily be estimated by applying
their approach to estimate Ft using EUR-CHF option prices and plugging the
estimated values into the European put option price formula. Notice that the
costs under this framework constitute the minimum costs of implementing a
minimum exchange rate regime, as the price of the put option in Equation (12)
(for T → 0) is half as large as the costs implied by the modeling approach
proposed in Sections 2 and 3 (see GERBER and PAFUMI (2000) for a proof).
Nevertheless, since the approach in HANKE, POULSEN, and WEISSENSTEINER (2015)
results in option prices on the EUR-CHF FX rate that violate the put-call parity for
compound options and therefore are not arbitrage-free, since Equation (12) does
not hold in general11 and since the model in Section 3 is based on FX spot market
data, this paper prefers an alternative estimation procedure due to HANKE,
POULSEN, and WEISSENSTEINER (2014) that relies on spot currency data instead.
Their approach is based on the structural credit risk model on page 42 ff. in
LANDO (2004). Moreover, the dynamics of the estimated latent EUR-CHF FX rate in
HANKE, POULSEN, and WEISSENSTEINER (2014) are closer to the results in JERMANN (2015)
10 However, as the domestic central bank has the power to cancel the European put option at
every point of time, from an investor’s point of view, they should model the European put
option as an Israeli option in the spirit of KIFER (2000) and KÜHN and KYPRIANOU (2007), an option
which puts an upper bound on the time value conceded to the option buyer by introducing the
callable feature (KUHN and KYPRIANOU, 2007). Modeling the put option as an Israeli option would
then make the put option less valuable.
11 As already mentioned, the approach in HANKE, POULSEN, and WEISSENSTEINER (2014) and HANKE,
POULSEN, and WEISSENSTEINER (2015) both require ex-ante with 100% certainty that the domestic
interest rate remains close to zero and that the foreign interest rate remains larger than the
domestic interest rate throughout the period of interest and is therefore less general then the
presented model (and not applicable to the Czech case, for instance).
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than the results in HANKE, POULSEN, and WEISSENSTEINER (2015), which makes us feel
more comfortable with the approach in HANKE, POULSEN, and WEISSENSTEINER (2014).
HANKE, POULSEN, and WEISSENSTEINER (2014) use the transition probability density
of the stochastic process {ln(Ft)} which is assumed to follow a GBM and condition
this density on the exchange rate just before the minimum exchange rate was
announced (i. e., ln(F–1)). Using the definition of the observed spot exchange rate
in Equation (12) and the Garman-Kohlhagen put option price formula, applying
both the transformation and the inverse function theorem, taking the natural
logarithm and maximizing the resulting log-likelihood, they obtain the time
series of the latent exchange rate Ft in the period of interest by “inverting” the
put option price formula numerically. The costs of implementing a one-sided
target zone can then be estimated by plugging in the parameter estimates into
Equation (12). The results of this approach will be denoted by “model 2”.
Alternatively, the costs of enforcing a minimum exchange rate regime can
be proxied by the modeling approach in IMAI and BOYLE (2001), adjusting
Equation (14) in their paper for the case of currencies. Their model is based on
a lookback option on the latent exchange rate Ft and is closely related to the
model in Section 3. Hence, using the estimated latent exchange rate F^t in HANKE,
POULSEN, and WEISSENSTEINER (2014), setting b= 1.20 and T= 1m, 6m and 1y, respec-
tively, the costs approximately equal:12
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with Mt = max 1, b=max0 ≤ s ≤ tFsf g, b′t = b=Mt and ~T ≡ T − t. This model is called
“model 3” in the following.
5 Empirical results
In this section, the costs of implementing a one-sided target zone are estimated
for the case of Switzerland from September 6, 2011 to January 14, 2015. The
12 Since both the transition probability density and F0 are given, alternatively, the expectation
maximization algorithm can be applied to obtain the expected value of Ft.
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present study focuses on the Swiss case, since for the Czech case the lower
boundary is not fixed to EUR-CZK 27, but only to be close to that floor level and
because there the step of proxying the American put option by a European put
option (arguing that the foreign interest rates are consistently larger than the
domestic interest rates and that the latter are close to zero; see footnote 11 in
Section 4 for more details) is less convenient, since for this currency pair the
drift rate μ* has changed the sign several times since November 7, 2013,13 which
is another argument why the approach in Section 3 is preferred to the alternative
models in Section 4.
5.1 Data
To calculate the costs of implementing a one-sided target zone in Equations
(10), (12) and (13), the domestic and foreign risk-free interest rates r and rf are
proxied by the corresponding CHF LIBOR and EUR LIBOR interest rates for
contract maturities of 1 month (1m), 6 months (6m) and 12 months (1y). For
specifying the volatility level σ, option implied volatilities for call and put
options on the EUR-CHF spot FX rate from Bloomberg with an option delta of
Δ ± 25% and contract maturities of 1m, 6m and 1y are used, covering the
period from September 6, 2011 to January 14, 2015. Specifically, it is assumed
that the domestic central bank uses the previous day’s implied volatility as an
estimate for today’s implied volatility, following WHALEY (1993) and BAKSHI, CAO,
and CHEN (1997), among others, as compared to alternative measures, this
procedure has good forecasting power (see, e. g., SATCHELL (2007) and WANG
and DAIGLER (2011)). The volatility smile effect is captured by applying the
Vanna-Volga approximation as discussed in CASTAGNA and MERCURIO (2005),
thereby getting implied volatilities that are consistent with the previous
day’s smile curve.14 The minimum exchange rate b equals EUR-CHF 1.20.
The exchange rate after announcing the implementation of a strong-side
commitment S0 is set equal to the recorded EUR-CHF exchange rate on
September 6, 2011, which is (approximately) equal to EUR-CHF 1.21. The life-
time of the one-sided target zone T is set equal to the aforementioned FX
option contract maturities.
13 Measured by the corresponding CZK PRIBOR and EUR LIBOR interest rates.
14 More details about the Vanna-Volga method can be found in, e. g., CASTAGNA and MERCURIO
(2005), CASTAGNA and MERCURIO (2007), WYSTUP (2010b) and BOSSENS et al. (2010).
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5.2 The costs of implementing a one-sided
exchange rate target zone
In this section and to exemplify the theoretical model 1, the unit costs of the
SNB’s exchange rate policy vis-à-vis the euro currency from September 6, 2011 to
January 14, 2015 are analyzed. During this period, the SNB intervened with
unsterilized FX interventions (i. e., by increasing just sufficiently the money
supply to maintain the EUR-CHF FX rate above the minimum exchange rate),
whenever the spot EUR-CHF FX rate touched the EUR-CHF 1.20 floor.
Figure 3 shows the estimated target zone costs for several maturities, ran-
ging from 1 month to up to 1 year, assuming that the EUR-CHF exchange rate
follows a RGBM after September 6, 2011. The figure indicates that initially, i. e.,
in the weeks and months after announcing the minimum exchange rate of EUR-
CHF 1.20, the costs of maintaining the floor were relatively large. Moreover,
Figure 3 is also in line with the intuition that the larger the lifetime T of the one-
sided target zone (compare, for instance, V1m with V1y), the larger are the costs of
enforcing a minimum exchange rate regime, since it becomes more likely that
the domestic central bank will have to intervene in the future.15
Interestingly, Mario Draghi’s “Whatever it takes”-statement on July 26, 2012
had a minor effect on the target zone costs. It was not until the ECB launched the
Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program on September 6, 2012 that the costs
decreased significantly. This date initiated a period where the latent EUR-CHF FX
rate Ft continually increased and the costs of maintaining a target zone continu-
ally fell, until these costs reached a global minimum level for V1y in summer
2014.16 This low cost level may explain why the SNB continued implementing the
minimum exchange rate regime until the SNB finally decided to abandon the
target zone regime on January 15, 2015. Figure 3 also indicates that presumably in
spring 2013, when both the difference between the spot and latent EUR-CHF FX
rate had reached an all-time low on May 22, 2013,17 whereby the Swiss currency
had reached an all-time low since the introduction of the EUR-CHF 1.20 floor vis-à-
vis the euro and was close to being priced as in a free-floating exchange rate
regime, and when the costs of maintaining a one-sided target zone were relatively
high (in the period from March 2013 until the end of August 2014, the highest cost
15 Given the prominent role of the CHF as a safe haven currency in periods of global financial
instability, this argumentation seems especially plausible in the period of interest.
16 V6m and V1y reached their global minima on November 27, 2013 and July 31, 2014,
respectively.
17 Moreover, on this day, both the spot and latent EUR-CHF FX rate had reached an all-time
high.
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levels for V6m and V1y were reached on April 3, 2013), it would have been a good
period to let the EUR-CHF exchange rate oat freely again, as removing the lower
boundary may not have caused the EUR-CHF exchange rate to fall as extremely as
it happened on January 15, 2015 and as the costs of further enforcing the minimum
exchange rate policy for a further year (V1y) were high.
Comparing the situation in spring 2013 to the period when the SNB decided to
abandon the EUR-CHF 1.20 floor on January 15, 2015, some key macroeconomic
variables (e. g., both the Swiss GDP growth rate and the conditional inflation
forecast in spring 2013 vs. 4Q-2014 and the real effective FX rate vis-à-vis
Switzerland’s major trading partners in Figure E.1 in Appendix E) reveal that
abandoning the EUR-CHF 1.20 floor in spring 2013 instead of January 2015 might
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Figure 3: Target zone costs under RGBM (Model 1).
Notes: The figure shows the costs (in CHF) of implementing a one-sided target zone for a lifetime
of 1 month (V1m), 3 months (V3m) or 1 year (V1y), respectively, under the assumption that the EUR-
CHF exchange rate follows a reflected geometric Brownian motion (RGBM) from September 6,
2011 to January 14, 2015. The first marked date (26.07.2012) refers to the announcement of the
“Draghi put” (“Whatever it takes”), the second marked date (06.09.2012) to the date when the
European Central Bank launched the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program. The dotted
lines display the deviation of the spot and the latent FX rate St (in black) and Ft (in grey) from the
EUR-CHF 1.20 floor, respectively. Data source: Bloomberg. CHF exchange rate float freely again, as
removing the lower boundary may not have caused the EUR-CHF exchange rate to fall as
extremely as it happened on January 15, 2015 and as the costs of further enforcing the minimum
exchange rate policy for a further year (V1y) were high.
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have been less harmful, since the GDP growth rates in Switzerland and France or
Germany were higher in spring 2013 than in 4Q-2014 (see the webpage of the SNB),
the conditional inflation forecasts in both periods were numerically of similar size
(see the webpage of the SNB) and the real effective FX rate had reached an all-time
low in spring 2013 since the euro zone crisis erupted in 2010/2011.
Moreover, a glance at Figure 3 indicates that both especially the short-term
costs (V1m and V6m) and the gap between the spot and latent EUR-CHF FX rate were
considerably larger in the latter period. Consequently, without the abandonment of
the floor, the SNB presumably might have had to intervene in the currency market
to enforce the EUR-CHF 1.20 floor (as it was already the case in 2012) in winter and
spring 2015. The results in Figure 3 also show that the SNB could have anticipated
the EUR-CHF FX rate volatility that was observed after abandoning the floor, since
the difference between St and Ft was rather large in January 2015. Alternatively,
instead of completely abandoning the EUR-CHF 1.20 floor, the SNB could have
lowered the floor to a lower level, in the spirit of HERTRICH and ZIMMERMANN (2015), an
alternative also supported by BERNHOLZ (2015). All in all, however, it seems that the
timing of the SNB in deciding to discontinue the floor was rather good.
Interestingly, the dynamics of the target zone costs qualitatively accords
with the results in LÓPEZ and MENDIZÁBAL (2003), who develop a target zone model
and compare the costs of implementing a target zone in terms of both the
interest rate variability and the exchange rate variability to alternative regimes,
whereby the more credible a target zone is, the smaller the costs of a target zone
are, since Figure 2 in HERTRICH and ZIMMERMANN (2015) indicates that the credibility
of the SNB’s minimum exchange rate policy was relatively large in the period
where the target zone costs were rather low (in the period from March 2013 until
the end of August 2014 in Figure 3). Similarly and in general, a (potential) lack of
or imperfect credibility of a target zone regime makes the enforcement of a floor
more expensive, since the domestic central bank has to buy relatively larger
amounts of the foreign currency. If these interventions are unsterilized, the
domestic interest rate will fall accordingly, increasing the target zone costs in,
for instance, the framework of LÓPEZ and MENDIZÁBAL (2003). Estimating the
(relative) weights that the SNB’s policymakers attached to the variability of the
exchange rate vs. the variability of the interest rates in the period of interest
using a standard policy loss function may reveal why the SNB finally decided to
abandon the EUR-CHF 1.20 floor on January 15, 2015.
The result in Figure 3 can also be related to the SNB’s exchange market
interventions since September 6, 2011. Scaling V St, ~T
 
in Equation (10) by St,
the implied (percentage) misalignment can also be related to the SNB’s unster-
ilized interventions in March 2009 (or August 2011), when the SNB intervened in
the FX market with unsterilized interventions (see HUMPAGE (2013) for more
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details). As the empirical evidence in August 2011 may be more exceptional than
the former episode, which motivated the SNB to announce a minimum exchange
rate regime, this paper uses the data from the former episode in the following:
According to the SNB’s statistical database, the SNB’s EUR-denominated FX
reserves increased by EUR 4.538bn in 1Q-2009. As documented in HUMPAGE
(2013), the SNB started to intervene in the EUR-CHF spot market in March
2009 and most likely intervened in the period from March 12 to March 16. In
total, the Swiss franc depreciated vis-à-vis the euro currency by approximately
2% from March 12 to March 31. Therefore, focusing on the required depreciation
for a lifetime of a minimum exchange rate regime of one year as of September 7,
2011, September 7, 2012, September 7, 2013 and the same monthly metric from
September 7, 2014 onwards, the SNB would have had to buy EUR 62.33bn18 in
the period of interest, compared to an actual increase in the size of the SNB’s
EUR reserves of EUR 84.61bn.19 At this stage it is worth mentioning that estimat-
ing the volume or size of FX interventions by analyzing the changes in the
central banks’ FX reserves is a standard approach in the strand of literature on
central bank interventions (see, e. g., LEVY-YEYATI, STURZENEGGER, and GLUZMANN
(2013), ADLER and TOVAR (2014) or DAUDE, LEVY-YEYATI, and NAGENGAST (2014)).
Combining the required depreciation from model 1 with the results docu-
mented in ADLER, LISACK, and MANO (2015), whereby the purchase of foreign
currency in the order of 1 percentage point of GDP causes a depreciation of
the nominal exchange rate in the range of [1.7–2.0] percent, it implies that the
SNB would have had to purchase EUR currency in the range of [7.70–9.06]
percent of the Swiss GDP in year 1 (or CHF [48.7bn–57.3bn]),20,21 [4.30–5.06]
percent in year 2 (or CHF [27.2bn–32.0bn]) in year 2, [1.03–1.21] percent in year 3
(or CHF [6.5bn–7.6bn]) and [0.71–0.84] percent in the last quarter (or CHF
[4.5bn–5.3bn]), respectively.
To summarize the previous paragraphs: The presented empirical analysis
reveals important insights about the costs (in terms of the extra amount of
foreign currency) of implementing and maintaining a minimum exchange rate
regime and the factors that have an impact on these costs. Furthermore, the
results show how financial market information can be used by central banks to
18 (15.40% + 8.60% + 2.05% + 0.82% + 0.60%)/2.00% * EUR 4.538bn ≈ EUR 62.33bn,
where the numbers in parentheses equal the required depreciation in the indicated periods.
19 This number equals 1/3 the change in the SNB’s EUR reserves in 3Q-2011, the change in the
EUR reserves between 3Q-2011 and 4Q-2014 and 1/6 the change in the EUR reserves in 1Q-2015.
20 15.4%/2% * Swiss GDP and 15.4%/1.7% * Swiss GDP, respectively.
21 Averaging the quarterly Swiss GDP from 4Q-2011 to 4Q-2014 and multiplying this number by
four, the annual Swiss GDP amounts to approximately CHF 633.06bn in the period of interest.
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assess the costs associated with the implementation of unilateral exchange rate
policies. Before concluding this section, it is nevertheless worth emphasizing
that the size of the SNB’s FX interventions in the period of interest is extra-
ordinarily large: According to FRATZSCHER et al. (2015) (and ignoring the fact that
the available information on central bank FX interventions only covers sterilized
interventions, which is a reasonable approximation in a near-zero interest rate
environment, given the evidence from Japan in the 1990s, where the distinction
between both intervention approaches became obsolete (SPIEGEL, 2003)),22 the
average daily net transaction volume is equal to approximately USD 122.1m for
the larger advanced economies23 and actual activity is reported by central banks
on 43.5% of the trading days in turbulent times within narrow band regimes.
Hence, using these numbers and multiplying these numbers with the average
USD-CHF FX rate of 0.9258 in the period of interest, the size of interventions
would amount to approximately CHF 42.6bn.24
Which arguments may explain this observation? Since the Krugman model
relies on a simple flexible-price monetary model (FROOT and OBSTFELD, 1991), it
may be hypothesized that some of the underlying assumption may be violated in
the period of interest. For instance, it may be argued that the assumption of a
stable domestic money demand function or the validity of the purchasing power
parity is questionable in periods of financial turmoil. As a consequence, the
efficiency of unsterilized FX interventions may be lower than in tranquil periods.
Other explanations may be that the Swiss target zone vis-à-vis the euro currency
was not perfectly credible (HERTRICH and ZIMMERMANN (2015) and JERMANN (2015)).
Indeed, FRATZSCHER et al. (2015) document that FX interventions are more effec-
tive, if these transactions are executed in line with prior FX rate trends, which
may partially explain the extraordinary size of the SNB’s euro purchases in the
period of interest. Alternatively, assuming that the Swiss currency was indeed
fairly priced and not overvalued prior to the announcement of the floor, the
difference between the average EUR-CHF FX rate in the period of interest of 1.22
minus the average EUR-CHF FX rate in the month prior to the introduction of the
floor (i. e., from August 08, 2011 to September 5, 2011) of 1.13 implies a deprecia-
tion of 8.13%. Combining this number with the results documented in ADLER,
LISACK, and MANO (2015), whereby the purchase of foreign currency in the order of
22 Alternatively, the target zone costs can be interpreted as the maximum intervention size,
since sterilized interventions are less efficient than unsterilized interventions and therefore
require a larger size of FX interventions to achieve the same targeted exchange rate change.
23 Given the relevance of the Swiss currency in FX markets according to the most recent BIS
statistics (BIS, 2014), Switzerland can be considered a “large” economy.
24 USD-CHF 0.9258 * USD 122.1m * 43.5% * 260 * 10/3 ≈ CHF 42.6bn.
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1 percentage point of GDP causes a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate in
the range of [1.7–2.0] percent, it implies that the SNB would have had to
purchase EUR currency in the range of [4.07–4.79] percent of the Swiss GDP,
which is much larger than the average size of interventions in terms of GDP in
the range of [0.02–0.05] percent documented in FRATZSCHER et al. (2015). Hence, a
total transaction volume in the range of CHF 25.7bn-CHF 30.3bn might have
caused a depreciation of around 8.13% in the period of interest. Comparing this
estimated size of FX interventions with the actual EUR purchases and having in
mind the EUR-CHF FX rate dynamics since January 15, 2015, this may indicate
that the EUR-CHF 1.20 floor presumably pushed the value of the euro currency
vis-à-vis the Swiss franc beyond its fundamental value, thereby creating a
“Peso”-problem.
5.3 Robustness check
A closer look at Figures E.2 and E.3 in Appendix E, where the target zone costs
according to models 2 and 3 (see Section 4) are plotted, confirms the conjectures
in the previous paragraphs, since the evolution of the target zone costs over time
accords with the dynamics of the data in Figure 3. Hence, model 1 seems to
deliver results that are qualitatively similar to the results of alternative modeling
approaches. Consequently, the underlying assumptions of the model seem to
play a minor role.
6 Conclusion
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the central banks of small open
economies such as the Czech National Bank and the Swiss National Bank
introduced a lower boundary vis-à-vis the euro currency, the currency of their
most important trading partners (i. e., the countries from the euro zone). This
policy has generated a strand of literature that analyzes these episodes. The
present paper contributes to this target zone literature by proposing a model that
allows central banks and policymakers to quantify the expected costs of imple-
menting a strong-side commitment for an exchange rate that is (potentially)
“overvalued” prior to the announcement of the exchange rate floor. The paper
proceeds and analyzes the impact that the parameters that are under the control
of the domestic central bank have on these target zone costs, namely the lifetime
of the target zone, the domestic risk-free interest rate and the implemented floor
level. The presented model suggests first, that these costs are larger when the
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drift rate of the exchange rate is negative, as this implies that the foreign
currency is expected to depreciate vis-à-vis the domestic currency over time
according to interest parity. Second, a shorter lifetime of the target zone in
general implies lower target zone costs. Third, the lower the implemented floor
level, the more costly it is for the domestic central bank to maintain a one-sided
target zone.
An empirical application to the recently discontinued minimum exchange
rate regime that the Swiss National Bank implemented from September 6, 2011 to
January 15, 2015 complements the paper and adds insights into the presented
model, emphasizing the relevance of applying models that allow central banks
both to estimate these costs before announcing a unilateral one-sided target
zone and to monitor these costs during the period where it is enforced. The
model also offers central banks and policymakers a tool for identifying ex-ante a
suitable date to discontinue the exchange rate target zone regime.
The empirical evidence suggests first, that there may have been better dates
to abandon the EUR-CHF target zone from an ex-post perspective (although the
specific date when the SNB decided to discontinue the floor was well chosen,
given the circumstances) and second, that the actual size of these costs might
have otherwise been substantial. The robustness of the presented model is
assessed by applying two alternative approaches, which yield qualitatively
comparable results. The presented model therefore allows central banks and
policymakers to infer relevant foreign exchange rate information (from spot and/
or from option markets), especially when considering ex-ante the announcement
of an exchange rate floor or when monitoring the costs of maintaining a target
zone while it is implemented.
Given the evidence that in the 1990s the Deutsche Bundesbank not only
intervened at the officially declared exchange rate boundaries while the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) was
in place (FLOOD and GARBER, 1989), analyzing whether the SNB’s actual interven-
tions took place at a level above the EUR-CHF 1.20 floor, in the spirit of the
results documented in BARTOLINI and PRATI (1999) or VEESTRAETEN (2007) for the
ERM regime, would be a natural next step of the presented analysis.
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Appendix
A The interest rate semi-elasticity of money demand
B Identities for the normal distribution function
This appendix contains two identities that are used in this paper to obtain the
main results. The identities correspond to Equations (A.1) and (A.2) in GERBER and
PAFUMI (2000) for a=0 and Equations (3.4) and (3.5) in KO, SHIU, and WEI (2010):ð∞
a
expc.x  n x; μ, σ2 dx = expμc+ 12σ2c2Φ − a+ μ + σ2  c
σ
 
ðB:1Þ
and ð∞
a
expcx  1−Φ x − μ
σ
 	h i
dx
= −
1
c
 expac Φ − a + μ
σ
 	
+
1
c
 expμc+ 12σ2c2 Φ − a+ μ+ σ
2  c
σ
 
.
ðB:2Þ
In Equation (B.1), a and c are both arbitrary real numbers. Equation (C.2)
requires the condition c ≠ 0.
C The costs of a one-sided target zone under RGBM modeled
as a call option
In this section, it is first shown how the costs of enforcing a one-sided unilateral
exchange rate target zone can be decomposed into the price of a call option
Table A.1: The interest rate semi-elasticity of money demand in Switzerland.
τ β^ S.E. t-value
Intercept –. . –.
Δrt −Δr
f
t . . .
Notes: The table displays the result of the regression Δst =ψ+ α Δrt −Δrft
h i
+ ηt, where st
denotes the log EUR-CHF exchange rate and both the home and the foreign risk-free interest
rates r and rf, respectively, from September 06, 2011 to January 14, 2015. The vector β^ contains
the estimated parameters ψ^ and α^. Data source: Bloomberg.
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when the underlying exchange rate follows a RGBM plus the implemented
minimum exchange rate b, minus the value of one unit of foreign currency
denominated in domestic currency units (i. e., St). Specifically, using a modifica-
tion of Equation (11) in VEESTRAETEN (2008) or Equation (15) in VEESTRAETEN (2013)
and setting the strike price X in these formulas equal to the minimum exchange
rate b, the corresponding call option price (as of time t) then equals:
Cr St, ~T
 ≡ Cr b, r, rf , σ, St, ~T 
= St exp− r
f ~TΦ z1ð Þ− b exp− r~TΦ z1 − σ
ﬃﬃﬃ
~T
p 	
+
1
θ
St exp− r
f ~T b
St
 1 + θ
Φ z2ð Þ
(
− b exp− r
~TΦ z2 − θσ
ﬃﬃﬃ
~T
p 	o
,
ðC:1Þ
with
θ= 2
μ*
σ2
,
z1 =
ln St=bð Þ+ μ* + σ2=2
 
~T
σ
ﬃﬃﬃ
~T
p ,
z2 =
ln b=Stð Þ+ μ* + σ2=2
 
~T
σ
ﬃﬃﬃ
~T
p ,
where the subscript r in Cr St, ~T
 
is included to distinguish the call option price
under RGBM from its natural counterpart under GBM.
Lending fb exp− rTg units of the domestic currency plus the call option Cr (.)
ensures a payoff of ST at maturity date. Hence, the value of both equals the
discounted expected value of ST, which according to Equation 9 (using St instead
of S0) equals:
expr
f ~T
Cr St, ~T
 
+ b exp− r
~T
h i
= exp r
f − rð Þ~TEQRGBM STð Þ=V St, ~T
 
+ St. ðC:2Þ
D The maximum possible costs of a one-sided target zone
under RGBM
In this section, the condition that implies an upper bound for the costs of
enforcing a unilateral one-sided exchange rate target zone V St, ~T
 
is derived.
Taking the derivative of Equation C.2 with respect to St and using the derivative
of a standard call option under GBM with respect to St gives:
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∂V St , ~Tð Þ
∂St
=
∂Cr St , ~Tð Þ
∂St
− 1
=
∂Cr St , ~Tð Þ
∂St
−
∂C St , ~Tð Þ
∂St
+Φ − z1ð Þ
 
< 0,
ðD:1Þ
since
∂Cr St , ~Tð Þ
∂St
≤
∂C St , ~Tð Þ
∂St
(VEESTRAETEN, 2013).
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Figure E.1: Real effective CHF exchange rate.
Notes: The figure plots the monthly real effective CHF exchange rate from January 01, 2006 to
December 31, 2014. The first marked date (31.07.2007) refers to the date when the recent
financial crisis erupted in summer 2007, announcement of the “Draghi put” (“Whatever it
takes”), the second marked date (06.09.2011) to the date when the Swiss National Bank
announced the EUR-CHF 1.20 floor. Data source: Bank for International Settlements.
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Figure E.2: Target zone costs writing put options (Model 2).
Notes: The figure shows the costs (in CHF) of implementing a one-sided target zone for a
lifetime of 1 month (P1m), 6 months (P6m) or 1 year P1y), respectively, under the assumptions of
model 2 from September 6, 2011 to January 14, 2015. The first marked date (26.07.2012) refers
to the announcement of the “Draghi put” (“Whatever it takes”), the second marked date
(06.09.2012) to the date when the European Central Bank launched the Outright Monetary
Transaction (OMT) program. The dotted line displays the deviation of the FX rate ~St from the
EUR-CHF 1.20 floor. Data source: Bloomberg.
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Figure E.3: Target zone costs under RGBM based on the latent EUR-CHF FX rate (Model 3).
Notes: The figure shows the costs (in CHF) of implementing a one-sided target zone for a
lifetime of 1 month (V1m), 6 months (V6m) or 1 year (V1y), respectively, under the assumptions of
model 3 from September 6, 2011 to January 14, 2015. The first marked date (26.07.2012) refers
to the announcement of the “Draghi put” (“Whatever it takes”), the second marked date
(06.09.2012) to the date when the European Central Bank launched the Outright Monetary
Transaction (OMT) program. The dotted line displays the deviation of the FX rate ~St from the
EUR-CHF 1.20 floor. Data source: Bloomberg.
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